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Abstract – We investigate earnings management in unlisted 
firms across four emerging Eastern European countries: 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 
2003-2009. We are interested in determining whether 
earnings management is being practiced in emerging 
countries. The question arises as these countries increasingly 
have more importance in the European market, and till now 
have been barely explored. Specifically, we investigate 
whether companies from these emerging countries manage 
their earnings and whether they do it to increase or decrease 
the earnings figure. We also analyze whether the 
manipulation varies in time affected by different events, and 
cross-sectional analysis between the countries in the sample. 
Based on discretionary accruals during the period from 2003 
to 2009, the results show that an average firm from emerging 
Eastern European countries manages earnings downwards. 
Results suggest that the manipulation varies over the years: a 
decrease in earnings management between 2003 and 2007, 
and increase in earnings manipulation between 2008 and 
2009. We also confirm that there is a significant difference in 
earnings management between the emerging countries 
analyzed. Examining earnings management behaviour in new 
emerging economies may help to understand how managers 
cope with the pressure in highly competitive European 
markets. It opens new discussions and debates on the 
comparison of both European markets, and on the possible 
investigations of reasons of such manipulation.  
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Earnings management has received considerable 
attention in the literature as can be seen in the significant 
number of studies related to this subject. Most research 
considers earnings management as opportunistic behavior 
that arises under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric 
information, when the principal hires agents that may not 
have the same interests. Managers may have an incentive 
to make decisions in their own interest when preparing 
financial information to the detriment of the firm’s owners 
[27], [28]. Prior literature defines earnings management as 
a deliberate intervention in external financial reporting to 
reach earnings targets through various accounting 
practices and policy choices that may result in 
stakeholders believing certain financial information1.  
                                                 
1 However, some papers adopt an informative or signaling perspective 
[4], [102], [117]. They consider that managers use earnings management 
to reveal their expectations for the future of the firm, thus making it 
easier for investors to predict future performance. Other definitions of 
earnings management can be found in [2], [38], [97], inter alia.  
 
In earnings management literature, different aspects 
have been investigated. Nevertheless, earnings 
management in emerging European countries is barely 
explored. The fundamental changes that have taken place 
in the economic and societal structures in the emerging 
European countries after the fall of communism 
institutions create very different background from the 
North America and Western Europe previously examined.  
The change from communism to new democratic 
regimes, the rapid privatization, the institutional 
infrastructure, the culture, etc. are the factors that lead us 
to think that managers’ behaviour may be different from 
that in other countries. Moreover, these countries are 
becoming increasingly important in the European Union. 
Additionally events such as joining the European Union 
and facing latest financial crisis may have significant 
effect on the existence of earnings manipulation.  
The study focuses on unlisted firms from four emerging 
Eastern European countries: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic, during the period from 2003 to 
2009. Most of the studies on emerging countries across the 
world were based on listed companies; therefore, the 
current study presents new vision on the developing 
markets. We analyze whether firms from these emerging 
countries manage earnings and if so, to measure the sign 
of such manipulation. We also examine the yearly pattern 
on of earnings management behaviour looking at how the 
companies respond to the dynamic environment, 
considering two important events, joining the European 
Union and the 2008-2009 financial crisis and their effects 
on managers’ decisions for managing earnings. Finally, we 
investigate whether the earnings manipulation differs 
among these emerging Eastern European countries, 
regardless of their common communism heritage, cultural 
or social similarities.  
These results based on discretionary accruals models 
show that firms from emerging Eastern markets manage 
earnings and they do so to decrease earnings. The 
manipulation declines from 2003 to 2007, and increases 
from 2008 to 2009. We detect differences in earnings 
management among the emerging countries analyzed. The 
Czech Republic and Polish samples present the lowest 
manipulation, followed by Hungary. Slovakia is the 
country with the highest level of earnings management.  
Our findings contribute to the recent debate among 
practitioners, regulators and academics about the possible 
determinants of earnings management in developing 
countries. Investors and analysts try to look for clues and 
new tendencies in earnings manipulation. New emerging 
economies may help to understand how managers cope 
with the pressure in highly competitive European markets. 
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Opportunities for manipulation appear and the investor 
needs to fulfill their information needs. In addition, the 
study may be useful for academics, as it investigates new 
markets opening new discussions and debates on the 
comparison of both European markets (Western and 
Eastern). Besides, the change in the underlying business 
reality (incorporation of Eastern European countries into 
the global European market) is accompanied by the 
possible new ways and incentives for earnings 
management. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
the next section we present the motivations and 
background of our research questions. Then, we review 
the literature on earnings management. The third section 
focuses on the sample selection and explains the 
methodology we employed. The fourth part presents the 
results we have obtained. Finally, we present the 




Emerging Eastern European countries by recent 
entrance into the European Union (EU) made a significant 
step in the development and economic growth of their 
companies. They just start to compete on the open 
European market, which shows very tight competition. 
Western European companies are well-established and 
much stronger than emerging European companies. 
Additionally, the legal, economic, cultural and political 
situations in developing European countries (Eastern part 
of Europe) differ from those in Western European 
countries. [68] finds a relationship between some 
institutional factors, such as legal enforcement, investor 
protection, etc., and earnings management. This suggests 
that earnings management in these countries will not be 
the same as it is in Western Europe (as mentioned, 
Western European economies are well investigated in 
terms of earnings management).  
These countries entered the European Union (EU) only 
a few years ago, resulting in changes in the institutional, 
technological and economic environment, thus raising new 
challenges for firms. One of these is to be competitive in a 
large global market. Some firms manage earnings to 
appear stronger and more competitive than they actually 
are. For this reason, we are interested in investigating if 
Eastern European companies manage earnings and if they 
do it to increase or decrease earnings. This is our first 
objective.  
However, based on the earnings management literature, 
we expect that manipulation may change over the years. 
These changes may be in respond to many aspects of the 
environment where companies operating, such as: market 
fluctuations, economic cycle, macroeconomic conditions, 
among others. Dynamic environment is one of the relevant 
factors which may influence managers’ decisions [69]. 
[109] and [111] add that complex environment is 
important for managers’ decisions. [62] points out, as well, 
that environmental uncertainty is likely to affect firms’ 
performance.  
The firms’ environment is changing. The managers may 
respond to those changes. We think that managers try to 
cope with the fluctuations of the market and they also 
respond to these fluctuations by variations in earnings 
management. In addition, our analysis period includes two 
important moments: European Union membership and 
first impact of world economic crisis.  
For one side, there is our perception of shrinking 
possibilities of managing results, as candidate states 
implemented numerous legislative measures facing with 
political pressure from the European Commission derived 
from EU membership. Indeed, the harmonization process 
started long before the accession; however, the direct and 
the biggest impact on the companies has been observed in 
the years of immediate preparation, accession, and years 
just after the EU membership. During the transition 
period, new EU membership countries were active in 
reviewing and amending key legislation to adapt to new 
European requirements. The EU Commission proposed 
principles for improving regulations, such as: development 
and implementation of national anti-corruption strategies 
or programs covering both preventive and repressive 
measures. It was created a competent and visible control 
bodies. It appears the development of targeted 
investigative techniques, statistics and indicators. Clear 
and transparent rules on party financing, and external 
financial control of political parties were required [26]. 
On the other side, first impact of financial crisis could 
be noticed between 2008 and 2009. Therefore, in a period 
of crisis, when investors are pessimistic about earnings 
news, managers rely on more earnings management and 
report similar earnings level as previous periods (they may 
manipulate more if they are not able to reach established 
earnings). This is partly due to increased worries about 
potential lost of investors.  
Nevertheless, other view may suggest that in worse 
periods impact of the audit affects the quality of the 
financial information and the manipulation decreases, see 
[18], [30]. [18], for example, describes that managers 
during the periods of crisis manipulate less their earnings 
because due to the audit quality the quality of the provided 
financial reports improve. Additionally, [7] explains that 
managers smooth the effect of fluctuation of the markets 
because market reacts more adversely to changes in 
earnings. 
Finally, the emerging Eastern European market seems to 
be similar countries. The four countries considered give 
the impression of having the same conditions and 
circumstances, since they are all post-communist 
countries. Moreover, since the four countries are in a 
transition phase to democratic politics and market 
economies, we expect earnings management to be similar 
in all four. The cultural, social and legal aspects, among 
others, of each country may have some influence on the 
perception of manipulation but we do not expect this 
perception to differ greatly.  
When former regimes collapse and new ones adapt to 
democratic and market-oriented societies, the outcome is a 
weak and inconsistent legal framework combined with few 
controls and the persistence of the culture of state 
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intervention. This facilitates the emergence of corruption 
as one of the key governance problems in this region. The 
rapid privatization undertaken in many post-communist 
countries in the absence of proper institutional 
infrastructure and safeguards to ensure fairness and 
transparency further expand the scope for corruption. The 
massive transfer of public assets to private hands in many 
cases reinforces rather than undermines corrupt networks 
[58]. Nevertheless, the emerging Eastern European 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 have been relatively 
more successful at improving their overall governance 
systems during their long transition period, and this –
rather than external political pressure in the run-up to 
accession– may be one reason why their anti-corruption 
measures appear effective and resilient.  
However, considering the macroeconomic situation of 
these countries, we observe significant differences 
between them. Poland and the Czech Republic have lower 
inflation rates, lower unemployment, and higher GDP (see 
Appendix 1), showing better resistance and economic 
stability in comparison to Slovakia and Hungary. Since 
there are macroeconomic differences among countries, we 
investigate whether there are differences in earnings 
management between these countries. Prior literature 
provides our ample discussion on the influence on the 
macroeconomic environment on companies, which indeed 
may influence earnings management. For example, better 
local country development may constrain earnings 
management, while poor economic situations lead to 
higher manipulation over time, as managers try to fulfil 
previously established companies’ objectives [93]; se also 
[1], [10], [17], [35], [46], [47], [49], [57], [61], [67], [68], 
[113].  
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Taking into consideration the sample selection, the 
majority of studies on earnings management are based on 
US sample. We should point out that a significant number 
of studies are based on the Asian emerging market. 
However, there are almost no studies on European 
emerging markets. Mostly, European studies are based on 
the Western European countries. Fig. 1 shows the 
distribution of the total earnings management studies in 
term of the sample selection.  
The literature defines emerging market as a country that 
has some characteristics of a developed market, but does 
not meet standards to be a developed market [81]. Among 
the largest and developing economies Brazil, China, India, 
Russia, followed by Indonesia, Mexico, Korea, Malaysia, 
Bangladesh are mentioned as examples of emerging 
economies in the world. In Europe, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia represent mainly emerging countries. Appendix 2 
presents country origin, the objectives and obtained results 
of key studies on earnings management based on the 













Fig. 1. Distribution of studies of earnings management 
related to continents 
We have analyzed a total of 207 articles on earnings management. 14 
papers are descriptive papers, and 177 are papers represent studies based 
on country sample, within the period of 1985 and 2012.    
Source: The author 
 
Recently, there have been more studies on emerging 
Asian economies. There are also a few descriptive studies 
based on samples from developing European countries, 
and we contribute to this stream of literature.  
Prior literature investigates incentives to manage 
earnings. Following the study of [38], they can be 
classified: capital market incentives, contracting incentives 
and political incentives2. Related to the emerging 
countries, researchers focus on incentives, such as: the 
managers’ decisions to opt for managing earnings and the 
tax incentives [72]; earnings manipulation to avoid 
reporting losses and sustain current performance [11] and 
[123], incentives related to obtain receive subsidies [15] or 
incentives related to the capital market [73] and [124].  
Prior research has also investigated factors that may 
influence earnings management, such as, corporate 
governance, the importance of the audit committee and its 
role, investor protection, legal enforcement, etc3. In 
emerging economies setting boards and ownership 
structure have been shown to earnings manipulation [24], 
[55], [70], [71], [85], [86] and [96]. Another factor si the 
relationship between audit quality and earnings 
management over different macroeconomic periods [14], 
[39]. Finally, [73] focused on the quality of corporate 
governance and earnings management.  
Another stream of research evaluates the existence of 
earnings management and develops the measurement of 
earnings management, e.g., [66], [78], [90], [105], [112], 
[120], [123].  
Therefore, in present study we contribute to the recent 
debate among practitioners, regulators and academics 
about the existence of earnings management in new 
developing countries, till now barely explored, as the 
investors and analysts try to look for new tendencies in 
earnings manipulation. These countries start to have 
increasing impact on the European economies. They 
gradually improve in terms of doing business, technology, 
competitiveness, information, etc. In consequence, we try 
to respond whether companies from emerging markets 
manipulate earnings, how they manipulate, if the 
manipulation is the same or different among countries, etc. 
We also highlight some of the possible macroeconomic 
conditions that may influence earnings management.  
                                                 
2 See also papers of [3], [12], [17], [20], [37], [38], [41], [52], [76], [86], 
[100], [107], among others.  
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In consequence, our study has two main composing 
elements: the empirical evidence of earnings management 
of Eastern European countries analysing cross-country and 
time differences; and the descriptive analysis of the 
possible reasons for the managers’ earnings management 
behaviour based on the literature.  
 
IV. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1. Sample and Analysis Period 
The sample comprises non-financial and non-listed 
firms from the emerging European countries: Poland, 
Hungry, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Previous 
studies on developing countries based their samples on the 
listed companies. Therefore, our study contributes to the 
literature4. We select these four countries for the following 
reasons.  
The selected countries are former communism countries. 
These countries experienced dramatic change when they 
found themselves within the communist bloc from 1945 to 
1989. It caused changes in political, cultural, economic 
and social life. In 1989, a wave of revolutions in the 
communist bloc countries dissolved the existing political 
regime and all our selected four countries became 
countries with a democratic system. Following, they 
started the process of transition to a market economy [32].  
Additionally, our sample of emerging countries joined 
the European Union in May 2004. Moreover, all our four 
countries are members of the Visegrad Group (also known 
as the "Visegrad Four5" or simply "V4"), which reflects 
the efforts of the developing countries of the Central 
European region to work together in a number of fields of 
common interest within the all-European integration6. 
We focus on the period from 2003 to 2009 for three 
reasons. First, we are interested in the evaluation of 
earnings management in emerging European countries 
before and after joining the European Union. Before 2004, 
Eastern European companies were developing, growing 
and transforming 10 years after the collapse of 
communism regime. The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia transformed from central planning 
towards a market economy. We want to test the effect of 
these transformations on managers’ behaviour. Second, we 
are interested in testing the managers’ activity in a period 
affected by the financial crisis (2008-2009).  
We use the AMADEUS database to collect the sample, 
and retain those firms for which data is available for the 
variables considered for all the years included in the study 
(2003-2009). For each variable, we eliminate outliers 
falling outside the range set by the mean value plus/minus 
three times the standard deviation. The sample comprises a 
total of 4,499 companies for each year, in total 31,493 
observations. Hungary is the country with the fewest (742 
observations) and Poland with the most (15,302).  
                                                 
4 Additionally, only around 5% of the total of the companies of the 
emerging Eastern European counties represent listed companies.  
5 see http://www.visegradgroup.eu/ 
6 In February 1991, Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovakia), Hungary and 
Poland met in the city of Visegrad (Hungary) and agreed on a 
“Declaration of Cooperation on the Road to European Integration” 
In Eastern European countries the IFRS is required for 
consolidated financial statements of listed companies, 
since it is mandatory by EU. Some listed companies also 
apply IFRS to prepare separate financial statements 
because of EU allowed member states to decide about it. 
We work with non-consolidated financial statements 
prepared under local GAAP7 to avoid the impact of IFRS 
implementation and its effect on the companies’ earnings. 
Our final sample is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sample selection procedure 
  
Czech 














(779) (208) (62) (163) (1,212) 
Extreme 
values 




2,033 2,186 106 174 4,499 
Number of 
observations 
14,231 15,302 742 1,218 31,493 
 
Following we describe our sample focusing on some of 
the main variables, see Fig. 2. Focusing on some main 
descriptive variables (total assets, sales, ROA) we clearly 
identify that Eastern European companies show solid and 
significant growth, with the exception of 2008 and 2009. 
Between these years companies have been affected by the 
first impact of the world financial crisis. [82] points out, 
by mid-2007, over-dependence on market forces and 
mechanisms without proper and workable regulatory 
mechanisms and systems in place to govern the 
globalization process, led to the appearance of large cracks 
threatening the stability of the world economy on two 
fronts: a sharp hike in primary commodity prices and the 
global financial crisis. Many primary commodities 
registered a steep rise in prices since 2002, reaching an all-
time high in 2007-2008, with extreme fluctuations. [8] 
confirms the existing effects of the global financial crisis 







                                                 
7 Local normative has not been changed Turing our sample period in all 
our sample countries.  
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Fig. 2. Descriptive statistics on the sample 
Panel A. Assets (mean) by country 
Source: The author 
 
2. Methodology 
In the literature we find at least three main research 
designs for detecting earnings management: those based 
on aggregate accruals, those based on specific accruals and 
those based on the distribution of earnings after 
management [80].  
First approach identifies discretionary accruals based on 
the relation between total accruals and hypothesized 
explanatory factors. The Jones model [50] and its 
modifications have been used by prior research to improve 
the detection model. They introduced a regression 
approach to control for the non-discretionary part of 
accruals. These approaches are typically called aggregate 
accruals studies and include, among others, the models 
proposed by Dechow, Richardson and Tuna [21], Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney model [23], Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan model [51], Kasznik model [52], Key 
model [54], Kothari, Leone, and Wesley model [62], 
Larcker and Richardson model [65], Shivakumar model 
[100], Teoh, Welch and Wong model [106], and Yoon and 
Miller model [123].  
A second approach is to model specific accruals, as in 
[79]. These studies often focus on industry settings in 
which a single accrual is sizable and requires substantial 
judgment. A third approach is to examine the statistical 
properties of earnings to identify behaviour that influences 
earnings, as developed by [12] and [25].  
To detect earnings management, we use aggregated 
accruals, specifically the discretionary part of the accruals 
in relation to the total accrual. Accruals are the part of 
revenues and expenses that do not imply collections and 
payments, and they are defined as the difference between 
profit and operating cash flows. Due to the lack of data for 
operating cash flow for many of the companies in the 
sample, we calculate total accruals (TA) according to 





   
  
  (1) 
where, ∆Receivables is the change in accounts receivable, 
∆Inventories is the change in inventories, ∆Payables is the 
change in accounts payable and DEP is the depreciation 
and amortization expense. The subscripts i and t refer to 
the firm and the year respectively. Changes are calculated 
with respect to the prior year. 
However, not all accruals are equally capable of being 
manipulated, and we may, therefore, distinguish between 
non-discretionary accruals (NDA), which are more 
difficult to manage, and discretionary accruals, which are 
easier. Thus, TA = NDA + DA 
Since the discretionary and non-discretionary 
components of accruals are not directly observable, we use 
the model which provides the most reliable results for our 
sample countries. Based on the adjusted R square, 
predicted sign of the coefficients, standard error of the 
estimated variables and the p-value, which represents the 
statistical significance of the variables, we evaluate the 
robustness and the effectiveness of ten models for 
measuring earnings management. We analyze the 
following models for both: time-series and cross-sectional 
analysis: the Jones Model [50], Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney Model (Modified Jones Model) [23], the Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan Model [51], the Shivakumar Model 
[99], the Key Model [54], the Teoh, et al. Model [106], the 
Kasznik Model [52], the Yoon and Miller Model [123], 
the Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna Model [21] and the 
Kothari et al. Model [62]8. The results indicate that the 
cross-sectional Yoon and Miller model is an effective 
model for our Eastern European countries in detecting 
earnings management judged based on higher level of 
adjusted R square, success in the predicted sign, lower 
level of standard error, and more significant values of the 
parameters.  
The results indicate that we may have a misspecification 
problem if we apply one of other models to our sample of 
firms. Other models do not seem to be reliable at least for 
                                                 
8 Wide literature discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both 
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our samples of Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovakian 
firms. Consequently, we use the Yoon and Miller [123] 
model (eq. 2): 
 
0 1 2




1it it it it it




TA REV REC EXP PAY





   


     





Where, itTA is total accruals in year t booked by firm i 
in period t; itREV  is the change in net sales revenue; 
itREC  is the change in receivable accounts; itEXP  is 
the change in operating expenses excluding non-cash 
expenses; itPAY is the change in payables; 
1itNCASH is previous period non-cash expenses, such 
as depreciation; itGPPEGRW  is a rate of growth in 
gross property, plant and equipment; 1itA is total assets 
from the previous period, it  is the error term. 
The basis for this model is the modified version of Jones 
(1991), a model proposed by [23], and attempts to improve 
it by including two more variables: itit PAYEXP   
and itit xGPPEGRWNCASH 1 .
9 As [123] argues, the 
latter variable associates noncash expenses with 
noncurrent accruals, and it captures a normal or non-
discretionary level of noncash expenses. This variable 
substitutes the property, plant and equipment variable 
included in [23], and it does not have an expected sign. 
The first variable, itit PAYEXP  , was adopted by 
[123] from [51]. This variable is included because 
managers can manipulate not only sales, but also 
expenses. It captures the impact of cash expenses on 
current accruals and allows us to capture properly the dual 
aspects of current accruals (sales through 
itit RECREV   and expenses 
through itit PAYEXP  ). For the first variable we 
expect a negative sign because an increment in cash 
revenues causes a decrease in receivables and then a 
decrease in accruals. On the other hand, the expected sign 
for the second variable is positive. It means that an 
increment in cash expenses causes a decrease in payables 
and then a rise in accruals. 
Equation (2) is estimated for the period 2003-2009 by 
applying the cross-sectional methodology. The regression 
was run per country and per industry. 
1itA  is used as a deflator to avoid problems of 
heteroscedasticity. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity per White [119].  
Having estimated the parameters of equation (2) per 
country and per industry, we apply the values obtained to 
                                                 
9 [122] provides a comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the main 
accruals models, specifically the Jones model and its extension. 
predict discretionary accruals for the 2003–2009 study 
periods. The prediction error is interpreted as the 
discretionary part of accruals, defined in equation (3): 
0 1
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     (3) 
where, itDA  are discretionary accruals for firm i in period 
t, and 
0a , 1a , 2a  and 3a  are the estimated values of αi. 
After obtaining the discretionary accruals for each 
company, we then investigate whether companies from 
emerging Eastern Europe perform earnings management 
to increase earnings. To this end, we calculate the number 
of companies that showed positive and negative earnings 
management per country and year. We also calculate the 
mean of discretionary accruals in positively ranked firms 
and the mean of negatively ranked firms10.  
To study if the level of manipulation decreases over the 
years, we look for any significant differences in the level 
of discretionary accruals for the periods 2003–2009. 
To this end, we calculate the value of discretionary 
accruals in absolute terms for firms in each country. After 
verifying the variable does not follow a normal 
distribution (see Appendix 3), we apply the non-
parametric Friedman’s test for each country. Friedman’s 
test, by way of individual analysis of the data (in our case, 
of the absolute value of discretionary accruals) per 
country, allows us to present an ordering of years (for each 
country) based on the level of earnings management. This 
helps us to evaluate whether earnings management has 
increased or decreased over the years. 
Finally, to know whether the level of manipulation is 
homogeneous among our sample of countries, we run the 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test using the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. We are also interested in 
investigating whether the level of discretionary accruals 
showed significant differences by pairs of countries. To 




The results of the regression parameters (2) are reported 
in Appendix 4. We can observe statistically significance of 
the variables. The descriptive statistics for discretionary 
accruals are shown in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
10 This was done to gain a more nuanced analysis, since it was possible 
that the results would show a larger number of positive (negative) DA, 
but that the mean in the DA made by the positively ranked firms would at 
the same time be lower (higher) than the mean in the DA made by the 
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Table 2: Statistics on discretionary accruals over the years 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Panel A: Czech Republic  
Mean -0.0308 -0.0184 -0.0337 -0.0187 -0.0167 -0.0410 -0.0492 
Standard deviation 0.1502 0.1428 0.1330 0.1384 0.1615 0.1253 0.1272 
Median -0.0409 -0.0301 -0.0421 -0.0289 -0.0286 -0.0484 -0.0518 
Mean per industry   
Industry 0 -0.0768 -0.0323 -0.0640 -0.0511 -0.0425 -0.0557 -0.0774 
Industry 1 -0.0544 -0.0425 -0.0495 -0.0486 -0.0281 -0.0618 -0.0538 
Industry 2 -0.0371 -0.0401 -0.0477 -0.0301 -0.0340 -0.0493 -0.0495 
Industry 3 -0.0271 -0.0319 -0.0472 -0.0303 -0.0413 -0.0390 -0.0406 
Industry 4 -0.0089 0.0228 -0.0048 0.0153 0.0158 -0.0233 -0.0479 
Industry 5 -0.0401 -0.0638 -0.0234 -0.0294 -0.0333 -0.0519 -0.0700 
Industry 6 -0.0625 -0.0461 -0.0535 -0.0517 -0.0585 -0.0413 -0.0410 
Industry 7 -0.0090 -0.0241 -0.0282 0.0240 0.0369 -0.0280 -0.0522 
Industry 8 -0.0099 -0.0093 -0.0186 -0.0539 -0.0334 -0.0491 -0.0037 
Industry 9 0.0032 0.0156 -0.0747 -0.0434 0.0128 -0.0802 -0.0382 
Panel B: Poland  
Mean -0.0381 -0.0187 -0.0382 -0.0279 -0.0190 -0.0466 -0.0529 
Standard deviation 0.1809 0.1602 0.1637 0.1655 0.1415 0.1390 0.1113 
Median -0.0448 -0.0318 -0.0442 -0.0379 -0.0334 -0.0451 -0.0504 
Mean per industry  
Industry 0 -0.0679 0.0012 -0.0456 -0.0408 -0.0530 -0.0361 -0.0551 
Industry 1 -0.0514 -0.0446 -0.0379 -0.0511 -0.0231 -0.0811 -0.0495 
Industry 2 -0.0256 -0.0203 -0.0564 -0.0274 -0.0254 -0.0600 -0.0562 
Industry 3 -0.0588 -0.0338 -0.0678 -0.0382 -0.0450 -0.0499 -0.0420 
Industry 4 -0.0220 0.0066 -0.0269 -0.0093 0.0059 -0.0369 -0.0528 
Industry 5 -0.0581 -0.0419 -0.0545 -0.0739 -0.0284 -0.0845 -0.0726 
Industry 6 -0.0204 -0.0127 -0.0255 -0.0098 -0.0086 -0.0134 -0.0432 
Industry 7 -0.0480 -0.0404 -0.0256 -0.0140 -0.0507 -0.0607 -0.0419 
Industry 8 -0.0749 -0.0578 -0.0277 -0.0577 -0.0507 -0.0337 -0.0640 
Industry 9 -0.0831 -0.0256 -0.0622 -0.0849 -0.0556 -0.0753 -0.0695 
Panel C: Hungary 
Mean 0.0433 -0.0206 -0.0301 0.0178 -0.0317 -0.0524 -0.0611 
Standard deviation 0.3085 0.1738 0.1156 0.1993 0.1077 0.1188 0.1097 
Median -0.0236 -0.0420 -0.0507 -0.0249 -0.0274 -0.0495 -0.0594 
Mean per industry  
Industry 0 -0.1204 -0.0203 -0.1308 0.0506 -0.0115 -0.0347 0.0101 
Industry 1 -0.0436 -0.0369 -0.0176 -0.0198 -0.0167 0.0420 -0.0319 
Industry 2 -0.0163 -0.0533 -0.0546 -0.0217 -0.0414 -0.0728 -0.0800 
Industry 3 -0.0701 -0.0580 -0.1001 -0.0500 -0.0494 -0.0667 -0.0765 
Industry 4 0.1174 0.0071 -0.0028 0.0750 -0.0191 -0.0503 -0.0565 
Industry 5 -0.0228 -0.0504 -0.0255 -0.0313 -0.0880 0.0115 -0.1039 
Industry 6 0.0307 -0.0178 -0.0538 -0.0466 -0.0603 -0.1233 -0.0339 
Industry 7 0.0163 -0.0426 -0.0538 -0.0132 0.0150 -0.0936 -0.0744 
Industry 8 -0.0014 -0.0041 -0.0229 -0.0729 -0.0015 -0.0057 0.0097 
Industry 9 -0.0564 -0.0914 -0.0928 -0.0939 -0.1193 -0.1345 -0.1177 
Panel D: Slovakia 
Mean -0.0490 -0.0284 -0.0531 -0.0427 -0.0241 -0.0707 -0.0522 
Standard deviation 0.1261 0.1234 0.0973 0.1230 0.1806 0.1478 0.1219 
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Median -0.0462 -0.0392 -0.0505 -0.0557 -0.0486 -0.0771 -0.0650 
Mean per industry  
Industry 0 -0.0650 -0.0359 -0.0653 -0.1115 -0.0889 -0.0921 -0.0975 
Industry 1 -0.0582 -0.0406 -0.0446 -0.0908 -0.0079 -0.0283 -0.0576 
Industry 2 -0.0592 -0.0128 -0.0618 -0.0186 -0.0569 -0.0809 -0.0769 
Industry 3 -0.0876 -0.0622 -0.0464 -0.0529 -0.0492 -0.0586 -0.0559 
Industry 4 -0.0195 -0.0255 -0.0610 -0.0244 0.0110 -0.0909 -0.0175 
Industry 5 -0.0556 -0.0763 0.0127 -0.1225 -0.0271 -0.0344 -0.0548 
Industry 6 -0.0238 -0.0231 -0.0737 0.0180 -0.0246 -0.0952 -0.0037 
Industry 7 -0.1357 0.0148 0.0014 -0.0284 -0.1150 0.0296 -0.1605 
Industry 8 -0.1002 -0.0384 -0.0262 -0.0686 -0.0213 -0.0974 -0.0890 
Industry 9 -0.0239 0.0231 -0.0592 -0.0555 -0.0917 -0.0670 -0.1215 
 
1. Sign of Discretionary Accruals 
The results (Table 2) show that our samples of firms 
from emerging countries manage their earnings11. Previous 
empirical studies on emerging countries indicate as well 
that firms indeed heavily engaged in earnings 
management, see studies, [55] and [123] in Korean firms; 
[90] in Bangladesh; [66], [124] in Chinese firms; [88] in 
Malaysian firms; [14] in Greece; [78] in Romania; and 
[105] in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, among 
other studies12.  
The results of the means also demonstrate the negative 
values of the discretionary accruals, which suggest 
earnings are decreased to avoid reporting earnings. Table 3 
reports the correspondence (percentage) of positive and 
negative discretionary accruals for the samples over the 
years, and the magnitude of means without considering its 
sign.  
The percentage of the observations with negative 
discretionary accruals ranges from about 63% to 76% for 
the Czech Republic sample; for the Polish sample, from 
63% to 77%; the Hungarian sample between 56% and 
76%, and for the Slovakian sample it ranges from 71% to 
76%. These results indicate that two thirds of the cases 
show the negative sign of discretionary accruals, which 
indicates a decrease in earnings. This distribution clearly 
suggests that our Eastern European emerging firms tend to 
manipulate their earnings downwards.  
Previous studies on emerging countries indicate contrary 
results, as most studies show that firms manage earnings 
to increase them. The firms tend to choose income-
increasing strategies [14], [66], [123], among others. 
Nevertheless, prior researches were mainly based on 
developing Asian markets, which is different 
environmental background. The unique empirical study 
based on the emerging Eastern European countries, [105] 
                                                 
11 The results of means are different from zero. Moreover, to test this, we 
generated a fictitious sample whose discretionary accrual results are 
equal to zero (no earnings management). We used this fictitious sample 
to represent the situation of no manipulation of earnings. We then used 
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test to confirm a statistically 
significant difference in manipulation among all the countries and our 
non-earnings management sample. This means that, in fact, all our 
sample countries—the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia—
manipulate earnings.  
12 For details, see again Appendix 2. 
confirms our results indicating that firms decrease 
earnings to avoid reporting high earnings figure because of 
the tax fulfillment on firms’ reporting decisions. He 
reports that firms aggressively manage earnings downward 




Copyright © 2017 IJIRES, All right reserved 
698 
International Journal of Innovation and Research in Educational Sciences 
Volume 4, Issue 6, ISSN (Online) : 2349–5219 
 
Table 3: Results of earnings management: positive vs. negative discretionary accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic  
Zero or small positive %  30.89% 36.35% 31.48% 35.02% 34.53% 25.73% 23.66% 31.09% 
Negative % 69.11% 63.65% 68.52% 64.98% 65.47% 74.27% 76.34% 68.91% 
Mean positive 0.1073 0.1064 0.0973 0.1087 0.1017 0.0884 0.0851 0.0993 
Mean negative 0.0926 0.0897 0.0939 0.0874 0.0792 0.0858 0.0908 0.0885 
Difference 0.0147 0.0167 0.0035 0.0213 0.0225 0.0026 -0.0057 0.0108 
                  
Panel B: Poland 
Zero or small positive %  28.50% 36.41% 27.72% 30.38% 33.62% 24.34% 23.01% 29.14% 
Negative % 71.50% 63.59% 72.28% 69.62% 66.38% 75.66% 76.99% 70.86% 
Mean positive 0.1005 0.1258 0.1085 0.1067 0.1144 0.0842 0.0740 0.1020 
Mean negative 0.0934 0.1015 0.0944 0.0866 0.0866 0.0886 0.0908 0.0917 
Difference 0.0071 0.0243 0.0141 0.0200 0.0278 -0.0044 -0.0168 0.0103 
                  
Panel C: Hungary 
Zero or small positive %  44.34% 37.74% 32.08% 41.51% 33.96% 25.47% 23.58% 34.10% 
Negative % 55.66% 62.26% 67.92% 58.49% 66.04% 74.53% 76.42% 65.90% 
Mean positive 0.1938 0.1303 0.0972 0.1616 0.0673 0.0771 0.0656 0.1133 
Mean negative 0.0766 0.1121 0.0903 0.0842 0.0826 0.0967 0.1002 0.0918 
Difference 0.1172 0.0182 0.0070 0.0773 -0.0153 -0.0196 -0.0346 0.0214 
                  
Panel D: Slovakia 
Zero or small positive %  25.29% 29.31% 25.86% 25.29% 24.71% 23.56% 25.86% 25.70% 
Negative % 74.71% 70.69% 74.14% 74.71% 75.29% 76.44% 74.14% 74.30% 
Mean positive 0.0991 0.1105 0.0636 0.1018 0.1562 0.0998 0.0914 0.1032 
Mean negative 0.0992 0.0860 0.0938 0.0917 0.0833 0.1232 0.1023 0.0971 
Difference -0.0001 0.0244 -0.0303 0.0102 0.0729 -0.0234 -0.0109 0.0061 
 
Furthermore, to evaluate the level of downwards and 
upwards manipulation, we compare the absolute value of 
means (the magnitude of means without considering its 
sign) of positive and negative discretionary accruals, see 
Table 3. The dependent variable is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals because we want to measure the 
magnitude of manipulation without regard to its sign.  
The results indicate that the absolute values of positive 
discretionary accruals are higher than the absolute values 
of negative discretionary accruals (the mean of positive 
discretionary accruals is higher than the mean of negative 
discretionary accruals). Only the last two years show 
higher values of negative means of discretionary accruals 
over the negative. 
The results indicate that between 2003 and 2007 the 
Czech Republic and Polish firms demonstrated higher 
values of positive means. In the two last years of our 
sample period, we observed fluctuations in the values, for 
example the Czech Republic sample in 2008 shows higher 
values of positive means. Nevertheless, in 2009 the 
negative means reached a higher value than the positive 
means. On the other hand, between 2008 and 2009, the 
Polish and Hungarian samples showed persistence of the 
negative sign, which means higher values of negative 
discretionary accruals than positive ones. And finally, the 
Slovakian sample shows higher values of positive means 
in 2004, 2006 and 2007. Then we observe a higher level of 
the negative sign of means of discretionary accruals.  
In light of the above, we can observe negative earnings 
management for our Eastern European emerging countries 
in most cases (more than 66%). However, the level of the 
manipulation indicates that upwards manipulation is much 
higher than downwards manipulation. The managers of 
our samples are more likely to round down their results, 
but only slightly. Taking the above considerations into 
account, we ran estimations to evaluate the dimensions of 
negative and positive manipulation. We calculated the 
dimensions of the manipulation due to positive and 
negative earnings management by multiplying the means 
for each year and each sample by the percentage of the 
observations with negative or positive discretionary 
accruals (Table 3). The results are reported in Table 4. 
We can observe that the dimensions of the manipulation 
by decreasing earnings are significantly higher than 
manipulation by increasing earnings (in all the samples, 
the manipulation by negative discretionary accruals 
exceeds that of positive discretionary accruals). Moreover, 
we detected the highest manipulation by decreasing 
earnings in the Slovakian sample, followed by the Polish 
sample. In contrast, the highest manipulation by increasing 
earnings we observed was in Hungarian firms, followed by 
the Czech Republic sample of companies. 
 
 
Copyright © 2017 IJIRES, All right reserved 
699 
International Journal of Innovation and Research in Educational Sciences 
Volume 4, Issue 6, ISSN (Online) : 2349–5219 
 
Table 4: Dimensions of the manipulation by positive and negative sign of discretionary accruals 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 
Panel A: Czech Republic sample 
 Positive DA 0.0331 0.0387 0.0306 0.0381 0.0351 0.0227 0.0201 0.0312 
 Negative DA 0.0640 0.0571 0.0643 0.0568 0.0519 0.0637 0.0693 0.0610 
                  
Panel B: Polish sample 
 Positive DA 0.0286 0.0458 0.0301 0.0324 0.0385 0.0205 0.0170 0.0304 
 Negative DA 0.0668 0.0645 0.0683 0.0603 0.0575 0.0671 0.0699 0.0649 
                  
Panel C: Hungarian sample 
 Positive DA 0.0859 0.0492 0.0312 0.0671 0.0228 0.0196 0.0155 0.0416 
 Negative DA 0.0427 0.0698 0.0613 0.0493 0.0545 0.0721 0.0765 0.0609 
                  
Panel D: Slovakian sample 
 Positive DA 0.0251 0.0324 0.0164 0.0258 0.0386 0.0235 0.0236 0.0265 
 Negative DA 0.0741 0.0608 0.0695 0.0685 0.0627 0.0942 0.0758 0.0722 
 
These findings do not confirm our expectation of 
positive manipulation. Previous studies confirm that 
managers may smooth good results to avoid reporting high 
earnings, see for example studies of [34], [102]. Emerging 
Eastern European countries, as recent members of the 
European Union (EU), have taken significant steps in the 
development and economic growth of their companies. 
They appear to be very competitive firms; however, the 
strong desire to survive on the very competitive and global 
market, may have led managers of companies from 
developing countries to decrease earnings and to maintain 
some non-reported earnings, instead of reporting high 
revenues and being viewed as large strong companies.  
Additionally, as the European market shows very tight 
competition. Western European companies are well-
established and much stronger than emerging Eastern 
European companies. Emerging Eastern European 
companies decrease their firm’s value outwardly and seem 
to appear weaker company than they are in reality. 
Consequently, they prefer to manage earnings downward 
to decrease the value of their firms and fill in “gaps” of the 
European markets. 
Finally, prior studies suggest that tax consideration can 
be a fundamental factor influencing firm’s financial 
reporting decisions, see for example, [12], [19]. In fact, 
financial reporting in Eastern European countries has been 
always heavily influenced by taxation requirements13 and 
the primary incentive for many firms is tax expenses 
minimization [105].  
 
2. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT OVER THE YEARS 
Companies manipulate their reported earnings (Table 2); 
however, taken into consideration the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, we have run Friedman’s test14 to 
                                                 
13 Tax regime has not been changed during our sample period in all our 
sample countries.  
14 Friedman’s Test is a non-parametric test used to test for differences 
between groups, see, for example [36], [40], [101]. 
test if earnings management varies over the year in the 
different countries. The results are presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Discretionary accruals differences over the 
sample period 












 2003 4.06 3.93 4.23 3.93 
 2004 4.05 4.41 4.33 3.86 
 2005 4.21 4.10 4.10 3.72 
Mean  2006 4.03 3.85 4.05 4.05 
Rank 2007 3.73 4.02 3.45 3.87 
 2008 3.92 3.80 3.78 4.48 
 2009 4.00 3.89 4.06 4.08 
Non-parametric Friedman test 
* significance at 10% ** significance at 5% *** significance at 1% 
 
Our results partly confirm our expectations. The test 
proves the significance of the results and verifies that the 
evidence suffices to conclude that there is a difference in 
manipulation over the years.  
Studies confirmed that increasing globalization, 
strengthening of the competition, changing of the firms’ 
environment; among others influence managers’ decisions. 
The managers of emerging countries must respond to 
those changes of companies’ background. Managers try to 
cope with the fluctuations of the firms’ environment and 
they respond to these fluctuations by variations in earnings 
management. [92] shows that earnings management is 
changing due to the level of firm’s risk and the volatility 
of the company. [62] points out, as well, that 
environmental uncertainty is likely to involve firms’ 
performance. 
Additionally, we detected two main trends in our 
results: a gradual decrease in manipulation in our countries 
(mean ranks) between 2003 and 2007, and a rise in 
manipulation between 2008 and 2009.  
The first trend, which did not include the Polish sample, 
and was only present in Slovakian companies between 
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2003 and 2006, which can be explained by the joining the 
European Union. Entry into the global marketplace and 
higher competition no doubt had a significant impact on 
these new members. They had to implement different 
legislation, prevent corruption and create competent and 
visible anti-corruption bodies. Adopting these new 
legislations indeed influence on the manipulation. 
Additionally, before the European Union membership 
the local normative permits more flexibility in terms of 
accounting norms15 (always taking into account fulfillment 
of tax regulations) and managers’ decisions. [53] explains 
that managers make certain choices to reflect better 
economic position of the company. It is due to the 
accounting regulation which permits the manager to make 
judgments and in practice to choose methods and 
estimations that do not reflect the true economic position 
of the company but provide a more positive image [38]. 
Emerging Eastern European countries along with the 
growing prominence of the business transparency, kept on 
introducing regulations and extending the scope and scale 
of the high quality of the information over years. European 
Union membership influenced significantly in the 
development and adoption of more transparent regulations 
and control, see for example, [59], [83], [95], [98], [104].  
Additionally, [55] confirms that emerging markets may 
create incentives for firms to manage reported earnings to 
satisfy the expectations of various market participants that 
are often expressed in earnings numbers.  
Moreover, the transition process from a socialist 
economy to a market-oriented economy (from a former 
Soviet Union country to a capitalist country) is steady and 
constant process: process of privatization of companies in 
the nineties, the process of the preparation for EU 
membership (2003 to 2004), the European Union 
accession in May 2004, and, finally, between 2005 and 
2007, the process of regulation in European rules and 
standards. This transformation required improving 
transparency and application European normative, which 
in effect limit the possibilities for earnings management, 
resulting in less manipulation, which confirms our results. 
However, since 2007 the situation has changed. We 
observe more manipulation between 2008 and 2009 in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, and from one year before in 
Slovakia, between 2007 and 2009. The global crisis started 
in late 2007 and early 2008 has impacted on the economic 
environment worldwide. It became more and more 
difficult to obtain good results from doing business in the 
global European market because companies were 
struggling with the financial crisis as well as the 
competition.  
Advanced economies were battling to maintain their 
activities and negotiations, shaken by the instability of the 
markets caused by the recession. Emerging economies 
were also impacted as the deterioration in the economic 
environment caused considerable concern around the 
globe. The emerging region of Eastern Europe was hit 
with full force in late 2008 and it is counted among the 
                                                 
15 See studies on Eastern European countries in terms of the accounting 
regulations, see for example: [44], [63], [103], [114], [118], among 
others. 
most adversely affected areas on a global scale [9]. These 
negative developments dramatically slowed down the 
convergence of Eastern Europe towards the Euro Area, 
and the crisis challenged managers to maintain the 
stability of their companies. [36] explains when the 
economic situation is bad, companies rely more on 
manipulation to weather the storm than they do in positive 
economic circumstances. Consequently, more 
manipulation is observed in the companies.  
3. Differences in Earnings Management Among 
Countries 
Our third objective was whether earnings management 
was homogeneous among our emerging countries sample. 
We ran the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test using the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (again we first 
verified that the absolute values of the discretionary 
accruals of our companies from sample countries do not 
follow the normal distribution, see Appendix 5). We were 
additionally interested in investigating whether the level of 
discretionary accruals shows significant differences by 
pairs of countries. To this end, we used the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test.  
First, the results of the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
test are presented in Table 6. The results of the Kruskal-
Wallis test reveal that there is a significant difference in 
manipulation among emerging Eastern European 
countries. Additionally, the mean ranks indicate that we 
observed the lowest manipulation in Czech Republic and 
Polish companies; followed by Hungarian firms; we 
detected the highest manipulation in the Slovakian sample. 
Although the four emerging countries we considered 
give the impression of having the same conditions and 
circumstances –they are all post-communist countries, 
countries in a transition phase into democratic and market-
oriented economies, with recent European Union 
membership– the above results confirm that there are still 
differences between them.  
 










Mean  Poland 15754.65 
Rank Hungary 16233.31 
 Slovakia 16780.77 
Non parametric Kruskal-Wallis test 
* significance at 10% ** significance at 5% *** significance at 1% 
 
The cultural, social and legal differences of each country 
have a significant influence on the perception of 
manipulation. Different emerging Eastern European 
countries differ considerably in the nature and speed of the 
development of employment, social and economic 
situations [91]. [13] and [125] confirm that cultural 
differences (business and financial culture, accounting 
culture, auditing culture and regulatory culture) between 
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countries are factors that can influence on the existence of 
incentives to manipulate accounting figures.  
Additionally, [6], [89], [108] and [115] explain that 
firms response to the positive and negative economic 
changes. They have opportunities and the ability to take 
advantage of such opportunities (to manage more or less 
their earnings depending on the situation). Our four 
emerging countries show difference in response to changes 
in their environment. Poland and Czech show better 
resistance, stability and flexibility in response to the 
greater uncertainty in the operating environment in 
comparison to the Slovakia and Hungary. In these 
countries there are lower unemployment, inflation rate, 
higher foreign investments, etc16.  
At the same time, greater uncertainty leaves more room 
for managers’ activities. Hence, managers have flexibility 
to express their imperfect business assessments through 
earnings management. As a result, we have observed 
lower earnings manipulation in Poland and the Czech 
Republic. Slovakia and Hungary are ranked with a higher 
score in the Kruskal-Wallis test, which suggests a higher 
level of earnings management; yet at the same time, both 
countries show significantly higher rates of 
unemployment, inflation or lower level of foreign 
investments, or gross domestic product. This confirms that 
each emerging country reacts differentially to the 
economic circumstances. [48] confirms that financial crisis 
indeed had an influence on managers’ decisions for 
managing earnings.  
Moreover, after running the Mann-Whitney U Test, see 
Table 7, we observed that there is a statistically significant 
difference in manipulation among three (of six) pairs of 
emerging countries: Czech Republic and Hungary; Czech 
Republic and Slovakia; and Poland and Slovakia. At the 
same time, we can conclude that there are no statistically 
significant differences between the Czech Republic and 
Polish pair, the Hungarian and Slovakian pair, and the 
Polish sample and Hungarian.  
Literature suggests that Poland and the Czech Republic, 
and on the other hand, Hungary and Slovakia are countries 
which may have a similar market growth, inflows of 
foreign investment, size of the companies, among others 
elements [45], [77], [105]. These environmental 
circumstances indeed have an impact on doing business by 
the emerging Eastern European companies and in 
consequence, have an influence on the managers’ 
decisions in terms of earnings manipulation, as shown our 
results.  
Therefore, the Mann-Whitney test confirms our 
previously obtained results: Poland and Czech Republic 
are significantly better developed countries than Slovakia, 






                                                 
16 For details see World Bank Database, www.worldbank.org 
Table 7: Differences in earnings management by pairs of 
countries 












  Poland 14825.06 








  Hungary 7764.22 








  Slovakia 8252.78 
 Z -1.386  
Poland- Hungary Mean 
Rank 
Poland 8011.34 
  Hungary 8252.67 
 Z -3.750***  
Poland- Slovakia Mean 
Rank 
Poland 8221.25 
  Slovakia 8753.66 






  Slovakia 993.34 
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney test 





Our objective of the study was to determine whether 
earnings management is being practiced in emerging 
Eastern European countries, and whether they do it to 
increase or decrease the earnings figure. The question 
arises as these countries increasingly have more 
importance in the European market, and till now have 
been barely explored.  
Therefore, we have analyzed unlisted firms from four 
emerging Eastern European countries: Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, in the period of 2003 to 
2009.  
The results show that unlisted firms from emerging 
European countries indeed manage their earnings, and 
they do it to decrease them. The companies smooth good 
results to avoid reporting high earnings.  
We also observe that this manipulation varies over the 
years. We detect two trends: from 2003 to 2007 we 
observe a decrease in earnings management; and between 
2008 and 2009 a rise in the level of earnings management.  
Finally, Kruskal-Wallis and Friedman’s tests confirm 
that there is a significant difference in discretionary 
accruals among the countries and over the years. 
Therefore, the former communist countries do not show 
similar earnings manipulation.  
Our findings contribute to the recent debate among 
practitioners, regulators and academics about the 
determinants of earnings management in developing 
economies and their impact on the markets. Investors and 
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analysts try to look for clues and new tendencies in 
earnings manipulation. New emerging economies may 
help to understand how managers cope with the pressure 
in highly competitive European markets. It is important for 
investors to obtain a true and fair view of this reality, as no 
longer Europe is only designate by Western European 
countries.  
Emerging Eastern European countries, as recent 
members of the European Union (EU), have taken 
significant steps in the development and economic growth 
of their companies. These countries experienced dramatic 
change when they found themselves within the Former 
Soviet Union bloc. Nevertheless, they are barely explored 
in terms of earnings management. Incorporation of Eastern 
European countries into the global European market is 
accompanied by the possible new ways and incentives for 
earnings management.  
In addition, the study may be useful for academics, as it 
investigates new markets opening new discussions and 
debates on the comparison of both European markets 
(Western and Eastern). 
Although we have filled in some gaps in our knowledge, 
other issues are still pending. A potential future line of 
research could include a comparative study of earnings 
management between Eastern and Western Europe to 
understand both markets. The issue of earnings 
management in Europe as a whole has so far remained 
unanswered. 
Future studies could investigate the factors and 
incentives for manipulation in Eastern European countries 
as well. We have verified and confirmed that Eastern 
European countries manage their earnings. Nevertheless, 
the reasons are still unknown. We have presented some 
descriptive analysis of the possible set of incentives and 
factors. However, we believe this manipulation may stem 
from also different set of factors, for example: low 
investor protection, gaps in accounting, low audit quality, 
information asymmetry, or the characteristics of the firms, 
among others; and further empirical analysis is needed on 
the incentives and factors. It must be pointed out the 
importance of the agency theory: the classical manager/ 
shareholder, owner-manager or owner-manager investor 
conflicts.  
Other possible future research would also focus on the 
possible control safeguards to earnings quality such as 
auditor certification, accounting expertise in firm, among 
others.  
Another possible future research could centre on 
developing a model that can better explain non-
discretionary accruals in emerging Eastern European 
countries to then obtain a more adjusted measurement of 
discretionary accruals and earnings management.  
Lastly, future research could be carried out based on 
consolidated financial statement of listed companies to 
compare the results with those obtained for separate 
financial statements. Moreover, it would allow us to test 






Appendix 1: Macroeconomic statistics of emerging Eastern European countries  
  
Country  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  
Panel A: Unemployment rate (%) 
Czech Republic  7.80 8.30 7.90 7.10 5.30 4.40 6.70 
Hungary  5.90 6.10 7.20 7.50 7.40 7.80 10.00 
Poland  19.60 19.00 17.70 13.80 9.60 7.10 8.20 
Slovakia  17.50 18.10 16.20 13.30 11.00 9.60 12.10 
  
Panel B: Inflation rate (%) 
Czech Republic  0.11 2.83 1.85 2.53 2.93 6.35 1.04 
Hungary  4.65 6.78 3.55 3.88 7.94 6.07 4.21 
Poland  0.79 3.58 2.11 1.11 2.39 4.35 3.83 
Slovakia  8.55 7.55 2.71 4.48 2.76 4.60 1.62 
  
Panel C: GDP 
Czech Republic  9,348 11,177 12,738 14,491 17,524 21,708 18,881 
Hungary  8,247 10,085 10,937 11,174 13,535 15,365 12,635 
Poland  5,675 6,62 7,963 8,958 11,157 13,886 11,295 
Slovakia  8,53 10,438 11,415 12,842 15,649 18,201 16,196 
  
Source: Database of World Bank (2010).  
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Appendix 2: Studies on earnings management in emerging countries 
Author (year) Country Companies 
number 
Objective of the study Obtained results 




Bangladesh 14 To evaluate the earnings 
management in the textile sector 
They found significant discretionary accruals 
in more than 35% of firms. 
Lee and Xue 
(2004) 
China 329 To examine the earnings 
management by loss-firms during 
1995-2000.  
They found that, before the loss year, firms 
increase the discretionary accrual to defer the 
occurrence of losses.  




They examine whether Chinese 
firms manipulate their earnings to 
meet the regulatory requirements 
Their empirical findings indicated that 
Chinese firms changed their behavior in 
response to changes in regulatory 
requirements. 
Lin (2006) China 112 To investigate the companies 
behavior in response to tax-rate 
changes  
The firms showed significant higher 
discretionary accruals for the years before tax-
rate increases. So, they take advantage of 
lower tax rates that are available for certain 
years. 





To examine the relationship 
between earnings management 
and corporate governance. 
 
They found that agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority 
investors account for a significant portion of 
earnings management in China's firms. 
Lo, Wong and 
Firth (2010) 
China 266 To investigate whether the 
governance structures help 
constrain management 
opportunistic behavior.  
The findings revealed that the quality of 
corporate governance (higher percentage of 
independent directors, lower percentage of 
“parent” directors, different people occupying 
the chair and CEO positions, financial experts 
on audit committees) is important in deterring 
the use of manipulated transfer prices.  
Yoon and 
Miller (2002) 
Korea 663 To explore the relationship 
between the operating 
performance of industrial firms 
and discretionary accruals. 
The results evidence that when operating 
performance is poor, the firms tend to choose 
income-increasing strategies. In addition, 
when operating performance is extremely 
poor, some firms tend to take a big bath, while 
some of the exceptionally well-performing 
firms tend to select income-decreasing 
strategies. 





To analyze the effects of some 
factors (control from ownership) 
on earnings management.  
First, controlling shareholders tend to engage 
more in opportunistic earnings.  
Second, the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals is greater for group affiliated firms 
than for non-affiliated firms.  
Johl, Jubb and  
Houghton 
(2003) 
Malaysia 596 firm  
observations 
 
To analyze the relationship 
between audit quality and 
earnings management, over 
different macroeconomic periods.  
Audit quality is found to be associated with 
abnormal accruals, and this association varies 





Malaysia 559 To assess the effectiveness of 
some board characteristics to 
monitor management behavior 
with respect to their incentives to 
manage earnings.  
The result showed multiple board 
characteristics are negatively related to 
earnings management, but only in firms with 




Malaysia 99 To study the differences between 
the earnings management 
practices by the Muslim-managed 
firms and the non-Muslim-
managed firms.  
The study found no significant differences 





Malaysia 155 To examine whether high surplus 
free cash flow is related to 
earnings management.  
The study showed that companies with high 
surplus free cash flow reduce income 
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Greece 633 To test the effect of audit efforts 
on earnings management based 
on the hours worked by auditors. 
The study concluded that low audit effort 
increases the extent to which managers are able 














To investigate whether public 
and private firms in three Central 
and Eastern European countries 
engage in opportunistic earnings 
management.  
Nevertheless, his methodology 
was based on phenomenon of 
benchmark. Additionally, as he 
pointed out there is a lacks a 
well-specified benchmark for net 
income and changes in net 
income prior to earnings 
management against which the 
main results could be compared 
(moreover, this paper is only 
working paper). 
Public and private firms engage in earnings 
management. Private firms to reduce tax 






To expose the problem of 
financial statements distortion, 
explaining the occurrence of 
accounting scandals and the role 
of the investor and the board in 













Poland  Descriptive 
research 
To study the differences between 
terms connected with accounting 
scandals, such as creative 












382 banks  To examine the importance of 
profitability thresholds in the 
operation of commercial banks 
from the Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
The results evidenced discontinuities in 
profitability distributions around the threshold. 
Matis (2010) Romania 101 To detect earnings management 
by Romanian companies using 
three econometric models: Jones 
(1991), Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) and Kasznik 
(1999)  
Jones (1991) model was found to be more 
significant for Romanian economic 
environment than Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 
(1995) and Kasznik (1999) models. 
 




Brazil 156 To investigate the role of 
industrial organization on 
earnings management by 
Brazilian firms.  
The results did not confirm that industrial 








To investigate the impact of 
cross listing and adjustments to 
US GAAP on the earnings 
management.  
They found evidence that adjustments to US 
GAAP do not have a significant impact on 
earnings management. 
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Appendix 3: Results on Normality test of our four samples  
Tests of Normality 
 
country 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk  
Statistic Df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
DA Czech Republic .113 14,231 .000 − − − 
Hungary .142 15,302 .000 − − − 
Poland .158 742 .000 .671 731 .000 
Slovakia .113 1,218 .000 .921 1,238 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
Source: The author 
 
Appendix 4: Estimation of parameters of regression of the Yoon and Miller model per country and 
per industry (2) 






































  Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW Adjusted R² 
Period of 2003-2009  
Czech Republic       
Industry 0 -0.0571 -0.2264*** 0.3079*** -1.0447*** 31.75% 
Industry 1 -0.0484 -0.4716*** 0.5098*** 0.3527*** 32.43% 
Industry 2 -0.0411 -0.2084*** 0.3277*** 0.7416*** 29.70% 
Industry 3 -0.0368 -0.4813*** 0.5583*** 0.2483* 28.20% 
Industry 4 -0.0044 -0.4770*** 0.5045*** -0.1350 35.86% 
Industry 5 -0.0446 -0.6149*** 0.6503*** -0.1568 50.24% 
Industry 6 -0.0507 -0.7074*** 0.7942*** -0.0473 45.06% 
Industry 7 -0.0115 -0.3956*** 0.4452*** -0.2905** 23.43% 
Industry 8 -0.0254 -0.5470*** 0.5954*** 0.0095 39.79% 
Industry 9 -0.0293 -0.2904*** 0.3000*** -1.0435*** 21.73% 
Poland       
Industry 0 -0.0425 -0.1716*** 0.3142*** -0.2329 24.37% 
Industry 1 -0.0484 -0.3163*** 0.3661*** -0.0500 17.46% 
Industry 2 -0.0388 -0.4498*** 0.5613*** 0.0284 29.20% 
Industry 3 -0.0480 -0.4662*** 0.5126*** -0.1337** 27.07% 
Industry 4 -0.0193 -0.6097*** 0.6817*** 0.0821*** 44.20% 
Industry 5 -0.0591 -0.4003*** 0.4537*** -0.0521 31.62% 
Industry 6 -0.0191 -0.1292*** 0.1835*** -0.3138*** 13.26% 
Industry 7 -0.0402 -0.4906*** 0.5682*** -1.2094*** 43.03% 
Industry 8 -0.0524 -0.5082*** 0.5396*** -0.1065** 16.17% 
Industry 9 -0.0652 -0.1844*** 0.1673*** -0.8992*** 40.01% 
Hungary       
Industry 0 -0.0367 -0.3106 0.5513 -2.2582 49.07% 
Industry 1 -0.0178 -0.2428 0.2621 -0.3137 7.09% 
Industry 2 -0.0487 -0.3457*** 0.4154*** 0.2743 17.15% 
Industry 3 -0.0673 -0.7783*** 0.8278*** -0.9826 68.42% 
Industry 4 0.0101 -0.2197*** 0.2303*** -0.5877 7.04% 
Industry 5 -0.0444 -0.6266*** 0.6681*** 0.1308 49.80% 
Industry 6 -0.0436 -0.9038*** 0.8541*** 0.9692** 75.82% 
Industry 7 -0.0352 -0.4333* 0.4381* -0.7641 11.88% 
Industry 8 -0.0141 -0.6744*** 0.6875*** -1.2637 45.99% 
Industry 9 -0.1009 -0.4608*** 0.4765*** -0.6381* 48.35% 
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  Intercept ∆REV-∆REC ∆EXP-∆PAY 
NCASH-
1xGPPEGRW Adjusted R² 
Slovakia       
Industry 0 -0.0795 -0.4055*** 0.4857*** 1.5234 72.95% 
Industry 1 -0.0469 -0.3169*** 0.3406*** 0.8069* 29.37% 
Industry 2 -0.0525 -0.4921*** 0.5771*** 0.0160 35.75% 
Industry 3 -0.0590 -0.3097*** 0.3718*** 0.2937 48.73% 
Industry 4 -0.0325 -0.0294 0.0716* 0.5467 10.16% 
Industry 5 -0.0511 -0.5677*** 0.5946*** -0.2855 56.17% 
Industry 6 -0.0323 -1.0387*** 1.1132*** 2.3247*** 92.27% 
Industry 7 -0.0563 -0.4754*** 0.4617*** 0.4197 26.85% 
Industry 8 -0.0631 -0.8226*** 0.8958*** -0.2433 77.29% 
Industry 9 -0.0565 0.1585 -0.1561 -2.4429* 15.65% 
* significance at 10%  ** significance at 5%  *** significance at 1% 
 
itNDA  - Non-discretionary accruals in year t; 1itA  - Total Assets in year t -1; itREV  - Annual change in revenues in year t; 
itREC  - Annual change in receivables accounts in year t; itEXP  - Change in operating expenses excluding non-cash expenses in 
year t; 
itPAY  - Change in payables accounts in year t; 1itNCASH  - Non-cash expenses such as depreciation in year t-1; 
itGPPEGRW  - A rate of growth in gross property, plant and equipment in year t.  
    Source: The author 
 
Appendix 5: Results on Normality test of our four samples  
(absolute values of discretionary accruals)  




Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
DA 
Czech Republic .241 14,231 .000 − − − 
Hungary .231 15,302 .000 − − − 
Poland .257 742 .000 .532 753 .000 
Slovakia .142 1,218 .000 .769 1,243 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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